Abstract. Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into one encrypting the same plaintext for Bob. The proxy only needs a re-encryption key given by Alice, and cannot learn anything about the plaintext encrypted. This adds flexibility in various applications, such as confidential email, digital right management and distributed storage. In this paper, we study unidirectional PRE, which the re-encryption key only enables delegation in one direction but not the opposite. In PKC 2009, Shao and Cao proposed a unidirectional PRE assuming the random oracle. However, we show that it is vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). We then propose an efficient unidirectional PRE scheme (without resorting to pairings). We gain high efficiency and CCA-security using the "token-controlled encryption" technique, under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the random oracle model and a relaxed but reasonable definition.
Introduction
Every application which requires some sort of confidentiality uses encryption as a building block. As pointed out by Mambo and Okamoto [MO97] , the encrypted data often needs to be re-distributed in practice, i.e., the data encrypted under a public key pk i should also be encrypted under another independently generated public key pk j . This can be easily done if the holder of the secret key sk i (corresponding to pk i ) is online -simply decrypts the ciphertext and re-encrypts the plaintext to pk j . However, this is not always practical. It is also undesirable to just disclose the secret key to some untrusted server to do the transformation of ciphertexts.
To solve this key management problem which hinders the practical adoption of encryption, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [BBS98] introduced the concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE). PRE schemes allow a secret key holder to create a re-encryption key. A semi-trusted proxy can use this key to translate a message m encrypted under the delegator's public key into an encryption of the same message under a delegatee's public key, as specified by the delegator.
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This can be done without allowing the proxy any ability to perform tasks outside of these proxy delegations. In particular, the proxy can neither recover the delegator's secret key nor decrypt the delegator's ciphertext.
Proxy re-encryption schemes have applications in digital rights management (DRM) [Smi05] , distributed file storage systems [AFGH06] , law enforcement [ID03] , encrypted email forwarding [BBS98] , and outsourced filtering of encrypted spam [AFGH06] . In all these cases, the gist is that the process of re-encryption, i.e., decrypting under one key for encryption under another key, should not allow the re-encryptor module to compromise the secrecy of encrypted messages. This was related to the compromise of Apple's iTunes DRM [Smi05] . With a PRE scheme, the problem is solved since re-encryption can be performed without awarding the proxy any information about the encrypted message. Besides DRM, distributed file storage systems also benefit in the sense that the storage server (proxy) can re-encrypt the files for different servers without knowing the underlying file content, and hence it is less attractive for hacker attacks since compromising the server does not compromise the files. Similarly, email servers can re-encrypt emails for different users with the same effect, say when a user is on vacation and wants to forward his encrypted emails to his colleague.
The Use of Pairings in Proxy Re-Encryption
Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss's seminal work [BBS98] proposed a bidirectional PRE scheme against chosen plaintext attack (CPA). However, as indicated by [AFGH06] , their scheme has a few shortcomings -1) the delegation in their scheme is transitive, which means that the proxy alone can create delegation rights between two entities that have never agreed on this, 2) the delegator's secret key can be recovered in full if the proxy and the delegate collude. Afterwards, a number of PRE schemes have been proposed. Their properties are summarized in Table 1 . The schemes are chronologically arranged.
Schemes
Uni/Bi Security RO Pairing Collusion Directional -Free -Free -Resistant Public-key-based Ateniese et al. [AFGH06] → CPA × × Hohenberger et al. [HRSV07] → CPA × Canetti-Hohenberger [CH07] ↔ CCA × × Libert-Vergnaud [LV08c] → RCCA × Libert-Vergnaud-Trace [LV08b] → CPA × Deng et al. [DWLC08] ↔ CCA × × Shao-Cao [SC09] → CCA? × × Ateniese et al. [ABH09] → CPA × Ours → CCA × Identity-based Green-Ateniese [GA07] → CCA × × × Chu-Tzeng [CT07] → RCCA × × Table 1 . Summary of PRE Schemes.
In this paper, we study unidirectional public-key-based PRE schemes which are secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). Informally, CCA models an adversary who can choose many ciphertexts and obtain their decryption under an unknown key, after seeing the challenge ciphertext (the one encrypting the message of interest) and previous decryption results. CCA-secure schemes often require ciphertext validity checking. As shown in Table 1 , most existing PRE schemes most existing PRE schemes no matter ID-based or not, are realized by pairings. Below we look into two schemes to see why pairing is a useful "ingredient". In the bidirectional scheme proposed by Canetti and Hohenberger [CH07] , the transformation key is simply rk i↔j = x j /x i ∈ Z p for the pair of delegation partners 6 pk i = g x i and pk j = g x j .
The ciphertext comes with the term pk r i for randomness r ∈ Z p which can be transformed to pk r j easily by using rk i↔j . The ciphertext validity can be checked with the help of the pairing functionê(·, ·) with respect to the generator g and the public key pk i or pk j . For the unidirectional PRE scheme proposed by Libert and Vergnaud [LV08c] (hereinafter referred as LV08), the transformation key is in the form rk i↔j = g x j /x i . The ciphertext also comes with the term pk r i and the message is encrypted byê(g, g) r . To recover the message, a pairing will be applied to getê(g x j /x i , pk r i ) =ê(g, g r ) x j ,ê(g, g) r can then be covered with x j . These techniques for unidirectional transformation and ciphertext validity checking intrinsically require the pairings. Moreover, the security guarantee provided by LV08 is only against replayable chosen-ciphertext attacks (RCCA) [CKN03] , a weaker variant of CCA tolerating a "harmless mauling" of the challenge ciphertext.
Our Contributions
From a theoretical perspective, we would like to have PRE scheme realized under a broader class of complexity assumptions, and see techniques other than using pairing in constructing CCA-secure PRE. Practically, we want a PRE scheme with simple design, short ciphertext size and high computational efficiency 7 . Removing pairing from PRE constructions is one of the open problems left by [CH07] .
Recently, Shao and Cao [SC09] proposed a unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings (referred as SC09). Let N be a safe-prime modulus. SC09 requires 4 to 5 exponentiations in Z * N 2 for encryption, re-encryption and decryption 8 , and incurs an ciphertext overhead of 3 (plus proof-of-knowledge) to 5 Z * N 2 elements. The modulus being used is N 2 . Its performance over pairing-based scheme (e.g., LV08), which is instantiated on elliptic curves consist of much shorter group elements at the same security level, is questionable. Their security proof relies on the random oracle and the decisional (not computational) Diffie-Hellman assumption over Z * N 2 . Most importantly, we identify flaws in their security proof which translate to a real-world chosen-ciphertext attack against SC09. A possible fix further degrades the performance in decryption time. In view of this, we propose an efficient unidirectional CCA-secure PRE scheme without pairings, under the standard computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the random oracle model. Our design is based on ElGamal encryption [Gam84] and Schnorr signature [Sch91] , which is (arguably) simple. Our decryption process is more natural and does not require the input of the delegator's public key, which is required in SC09.
6 For the bidirectional schemes, once a delegation is made, a delegator becomes a delegatee and a delegate becomes a delegator simultaneously. 7 In spite of the recent advances in implementation technique, compared with modular exponentiation, pairing is still considered as a rather expensive operation, especially in computational resource limited settings. 8 Speed-up by Chinese remainder theorem is not possible except 2 exponentiations in decryption, due to the lack of the factoring of the delegator's modulus.
In this paper, collusion attack refers to any collusion of a proxy and a delegatee which aimed to comproise the security of the delegator in any meaningful way. 9 Finally, to the best of our knowledge, there was no (R)CCA-secure unidirectional scheme which is collusionresistant.
Related Notions
Proxy encryption (no "re-") (e.g., [MO97, Jak99, ID03] ) also allows a delegator Alice to delegate her decryption power to a delegatee Bob with the help of a proxy. ciphertext for Bob. Different from PRE, these schemes require Alice to split her secret key between Bob and the proxy. In other words, Bob needs to obtain and store an additional secret for each decryption delegation. This may introduce other key management issues. In PRE, Bob just needs to use his own secret to decrypt ciphertext originally addressed to him or ciphertext transformed for him. Theoretically, he can be totally unaware of the delegation until he received the first transformed ciphertext from the proxy. As argued in [CH07, LV08c] , PRE is a (strict) subset of proxy encryption.
Another notion with a similar name is universal re-encryption [GJJS04] , in which the ciphertexts are re-randomized, but the underlying public keys are not changed as in PRE.
Our Definitions of Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption

Framework of Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption
A unidirectional PRE scheme consists of the following six algorithms [CH07] :
The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs the global parameters param, which include a description of the message space M. KeyGen(): The key generation algorithm generates a public/private key pair (pk i , sk i ). ReKeyGen(sk i , pk j ): The re-encryption key generation algorithm takes as input a private key sk i and another public key pk j . It outputs a re-encryption key rk i→j . Encrypt(pk, m): The encryption algorithm takes as input a public key pk and a message m ∈ M. It outputs a ciphertext C under pk. ReEncrypt(rk i→j , C i ): The re-encryption algorithm takes as input a re-encryption key rk i→j and a ciphertext C i under public key pk i . It outputs a ciphertext C j under public key pk j . This can be either deterministic or probabilistic. Decrypt(sk, C): The decryption algorithm takes as input a private key sk and a ciphertext C.
It outputs a message m ∈ M or the error symbol ⊥ if the ciphertext is invalid.
To lighten notations, we omit the public parameters param as the input of the algorithms. Correctness requires that, for any parameters param, m ∈ M, the following probabilities are equal to 1:
2.2 Security Models for "Token-Controlled" Re-Encryption
Our game-based definitions for single-hop unidirectional PRE systems are adaptions of the definitions of the original (second level) ciphertext security and the transformed (first level) ciphertext security in [LV08c] . As in [CH07, LV08c] our static corruption model makes the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption, the adversary only gets uncorrupted public key or corrupted public/private key pair from the challenger, and is not allowed to adaptively determine which parties will be compromised. Compared with [CH07, LV08c] , our definition considers the standard CCA security instead of RCCA security. However, this is at the expense of a relaxation requiring additional constraint on the re-encryption key that can be compromised.
Definition 1 (Game Template of Chosen-Ciphertext Security).
Setup. The challenger C takes a security parameter κ and executes the setup algorithm to get the system parameters param. C executes the key generation algorithm n u times resulting a list of public/private keys PK good , SK good , and executes the key generation algorithm for n c times to get a list of corrupted public/private keys PK corr , SK corr . A gets param, SK corr , and PK = (PK good ∪ PK corr ) = {pk i } i∈ [1,nu+nc] . Phase 1. A adaptively queries to oracles OReK, OReE and ODec.
-OReK oracle takes pk i , pk j and returns a re-encryption key rk i→j .
-OReE oracle takes public keys pk i , pk j and a ciphertext C and returns a re-encryption of C from pk i to pk j . -ODec oracle takes a public key pk and a ciphertext C and returns the decryption of C using the private key with respect to pk. Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it also decides whether it wants to be challenged with a original ciphertext or a transformed ciphertext. It outputs two equallength plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ∈ M, and a target public key pk i * . Challenger C flips a random coin δ ∈ {0, 1}, and sends to A a challenge ciphertext C * depending on pk i * and m δ Phase 2. A issues queries as in Phase 1. Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess δ ∈ {0, 1}.
The public keys supplied by A subject to the following constraints:
1. The public keys involved in all queries must come from PK. 2. The target public key pk i * is from PK good , i.e., uncorrupted.
The actual construction of C * and the constraints on the queries made by A are to be defined according to different security notions.
Definition 2 (Original Ciphertext Security). For original ciphertext security, the adversary A plays the CCA game with the challenger C as in Definition 1, where the challenge ciphertext is formed by C * = Encrypt(pk i * , m δ ), and A has the following additional constraints: 1. OReK(pk i * , pk j ) is only allowed if pk j came from PK good . 2. If A issued OReE(pk i , pk j , C i ) where pk j came from PK corr , (pk i , C i ) cannot be a derivative of (pk i * , C * ) (to be defined later). 3. ODec(pk, C) is only allowed if (pk, C) is not a derivative of (pk i * , C * ).
Definition 3 (Derivative for Chosen-Ciphertext Security). Derivative of (pk i * , C * ) in the CCA setting is inductively defined in [SC09] as below, which is adopted from the RCCAbased definition in [CH07] 10 :
1. Reflexivity: (pk i * , C * ) is a derivative of itself. 2. Derivation by re-encryption: If A has issued a re-encryption query pk, pk , C and obtained the resulting re-encryption ciphertext C , then (pk , C ) is a derivative of (pk, C). 3. Derivation by re-encryption key: If A has issued a re-encryption key generation query pk, pk to obtain the re-encryption key rk, and C = ReEncrypt(rk, C), then (pk , C ) is a derivative of (pk, C).
Definition 4 (Transformed Ciphertext Security). For transformed ciphertext, the adversary A plays the CCA game with the challenger C as in Definition 1, where A can also specify the delegator pk i . The challenge ciphertext is then created by the re-encryption process, specifically, C * = ReEncrypt(rk i →i * , Encrypt(pk i , m δ )). The only constraints of A are:
If pk i came from PK corr , C would not return rk i →i * to A in phase 2. 3. If A obtained rk i →i * , A cannot choose pk i as the delegator in the challenge phase.
This can be considered as a weaker notion when compared with [LV08c] .
Definition 5 (CCA Security of a PRE). We define A's advantage in attacking the PRE scheme as Adv
, where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by the challenger and the adversary. A single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme is defined to be (t, n u , n c , q rk , q re , q d , )-IND-PRE-CCA secure, if for any t-time IND-PRE-CCA adversary A who makes at most q rk re-encryption key generation queries, at most q re re-encryption queries and at most q d decryption queries, we have Adv
Derivative and Two Different Kinds of Security. Intuitively speaking, original ciphertext security models the an adversary A challenged with an untransformed ciphertext encrypted for a target user i * . In a PRE scheme, however, A can ask for the re-encryption of many ciphertexts or even a set of re-encryption keys. These queries are allowed as long as they would not allow A to decrypt trivially. For examples, A should not get the re-encryption key from user i * to user j if the secret key of user j has been compromised; on the other hand, A can certainly get a re-encryption of the challenge ciphertext from user i * to user j as long as j is an honest user and the decryption oracle of user j has not been queried with the 10 These original definitions also consider transitivity -If (pk, C) is a derivative of (pk i * , C * ) and (pk , C ) is a derivative of (pk, C), then (pk , C ) is a derivative of (pk i * , C * ). However, this is irrelevant for single-hop scheme like ours and [SC09] .
resulting transformed ciphertext. This explains the intuition behind the notion of derivative and the associated restrictions.
Since A can derive a transformed ciphertext with a certain related re-encryption key, one may wonder why there is another notion about transformed ciphertext security. This latter notion makes sense when the PRE system is single-hop, i.e., a transformed ciphertext cannot be re-encrypted further to someone else. If a proxy colludes with a delegatee, by the correct functionalities of a PRE, this collusion group can certainly decrypt any original ciphertext of the target user. However, for a single-hop scheme, there is no reason that this collusion group can decrypt any transformed ciphertext since it cannot be re-encrypted further. To conclude, the adversary is allowed to transform an original ciphertext in the former notion, but there are some re-encryption keys which it is not allowed to get (recall the constraints related to derivatives); while in the latter, the adversary only sees the transformed ciphertext but not the original one, and the adversary can get more re-encryption keys.
Our Definition of Transformed Ciphertext Security. The second constraint deserves more discussion. The compromise of rk i →i * corresponds to the fact that the proxy, which is designated by the delegator pk i for the delegation to the delegatee pk i * , is compromised. Ideally, it seems that whether the delegator pk i is compromised or not in this situation does not affect the security of the transformed ciphertext for pk i * . This is also what has been modelled by the definition in [LV08c] . However, if the adversary A compromised the delegator pk i and also the proxy, A can simply ask the proxy to surrender the original ciphertext Encrypt(pk i , m δ ) before any actual transformation, and use sk i to decrypt trivially. It is true that if the proxy was initially honest and erased the original ciphertexts after their transformation, the same attack does not apply; however, ciphertext is by definition public in nature and the adversary may have captured the ciphertext already and decrypt it when sk i is obtained. We believe that the relaxed notion still have significance in the real world.
Nontransformable (First-Level) Ciphertext. To view the above relaxation from another angle, one may feel that we lost a possible benefit of a single-hop scheme -some ciphertexts are not further transformable so very sensitive information can be encrypted in this form ("first level" ciphertext that cannot be re-encrypted). Actually, our definition does not rule out this possibility. Our definition given above only considers transformed ciphertext, that is, the challenge ciphertext which is generated from the re-encryption algorithm. It does not rule out the possibility of having another encryption algorithm Encrypt 1 which directly produces nontransformable ciphertext, when ReEncrypt(rk i →i * , Encrypt(pk i , m δ )) and Encrypt 1 (pk i * , m δ ) are actually distinguishable.
We view this as one way to get CCA security instead of RCCA security. Using LV08, it is possible to directly encrypt ciphertexts that cannot be re-encrypted which is indistinguishable from re-encryption, and the reason is that re-randomization can be done in the re-encryption process. Recall that the security guarantee of LV08 actually allows the adversary to compromise all proxies of the system; indeed, the re-randomizaation in LV08 can be done by any one without any secret knowledge -this explains why LV08 is at most RCCA secure.
Of course, it is required to augment the PRE systems with yet another encryption algorithm. However, it is often the case that the original decryption algorithm sufficies to decrypt ciphertext produced in this way. The interface of Encrypt 1 and its correctness requirement are exactly the same as those of Encrypt. The security definition is also simple.
Definition 6 (Nontransformable Ciphertext Security). For nontransformable ciphertext, the adversary A plays the CCA game with the challenger C as in Definition 1, where the challenge ciphertext is given by C * = Encrypt 1 (pk i * , m δ ), and A is disallowed from making ODec(pk i * , C * ) query only. In particular, A can get all the re-encryption keys.
Delegator/Master Secret Security. Delegator secret security 11 is considered in Ateniese et al. [AFGH06] which captures the intuition that, even if a dishonest proxy colludes with the delegatee, they still cannot derive the delegator's private key in full. The attack mode is quite simple and can be covered by the nontransformable / first-level ciphertext security [LV08c] . The reason behind is easy to see -there is no restriction in the re-encryption key generation queries, and decryption is easy when the adversary can derive the delegator's private key in full.
3 Analysis of a CCA-Secure Unidirectional PRE Scheme
is reviewed as below, up to minor notational differences. We use to highlight the places which introduce the vulnerability.
Setup(κ):
Given a security parameter κ, choose three hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} → {0, 1} 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} → {0, 1} 2 , and H 3 : {0, 1} → {0, 1} 3 , where 1 , 2 and 3 are determined by κ, and the message space M is {0, 1} 2 . The parameters are param = (κ, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , 1 , 2 , 3 ).
KeyGen():
Given a security parameter κ, perform the following steps: 1. Choose two distinct Sophie Germain primes p and q of κ-bit. 2. Compute safe primes p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 (their primalities are guaranteed since p and q are Sophie Germain primes). 3. Compute a safe-prime modulus N = pq. 4. Store sk = (p, q, p , q ) as the long term secret key.
Choose a hash function
Either secret key can be used to decrypt (any) ciphertexts, but both of them are required to produce a re-encryption key. Note that in the following description, the elements from the key of user X contain an additional subscript of X, e.g.,
ReKeyGen(sk X , pk Y ): On input a long term secret key (p X , q X , p X , q X ), a weak secret (a X , b X ), and a public key
, it outputs the re-encryption key rk X→Y = (rk
X→Y ), where rk
(1) X→Y = (Ȧ,Ḃ,Ċ), as follows:
To encrypt a message m ∈ M:
1. Randomly pick σ ∈ Z N , compute r = H(σ m).
, where the underlying hash function is H 3 . 12 5. Output the ciphertext C = (A, B, C, D, c, s).
On input a re-encryption key rk X→Y = (rk
The second equality holds since g X1 = g 
· π mod N , where w 1 is computed as that in [BCP03] , and π is the inverse of 2p q mod N .
X ; else ⊥. The delegator's public key (H X , N X , g X0 , g X1 , g X2 ) is required in the last few steps. This deviates from our framework in Section 2.
12 A signature of knowledge (c, s) of the discrete logarithm of both y0 = g x 0 w.r.t. base g0 and y2 = g x 2 w.r.t. base g2, on a message (B, C) ∈ {0, 1} * can be computed by first picking t ∈ {0, . . . , 2 
Possible Vulnerabilities in the Re-Encryption Key
Before describing our attack, we briefly explain how the re-encryption key is generated in SC09. Their ReKeyGen algorithm follows the "token-controlled encryption" paradigm, which is adopted by [GA07, CT07] and our scheme to be presented. Specifically, ReKeyGen first selects a random tokenβ to "hide" (some form of) the delegator's secret key a X (i.e., rk
X→Y = a X −β), and then encrypts this tokenβ under the delegatee's public key, (i.e., rk
Note that when the proxy and the delegatee collude, it is possible to recover a X . So the encryption of the token should use a mechanism that is different from the usual encryption on the plaintext (i.e.,Ḃ is computed using g 2 while B component in Encrypt is computed using g 1 ). Otherwise, it will subject to the following "chain collusion attack" mentioned in [SC09] .
Imagine that Bob (who holds public key pk Y ), who received delegation from Alice (who holds public key pk X ), now delegates his own decryption right to Carol. If the ReKeyGen algorithm requires Bob to use sk Y (i.e., the whole private key) instead of just some form of the private key (e.g., a Y in SC09), when his proxy colludes with Carol, sk Y can be easily recovered. Furthermore, sk Y can be used to recoverβ in the re-encryption key generated by Alice to Bob; the secret key of Alice, sk X , can also be recovered exactly in the way how sk Y is recovered. This clearly compromises the security of Alice out of her expectation, since her only delegatee Bob has done nothing wrong (perhaps except using an insecure scheme). This is where the schemes [GA07,CT07] fail, as pointed by [SC09] .
Our Attack
Shao and Cao [SC09] claimed that their PRE scheme is CCA-secure. However, in this section, we demonstrate that it is not the case.
Before describing our attack, we briefly explain how the re-encryption key is generated in SC09. Their ReKeyGen algorithm follows the "token-controlled encryption" paradigm, which is adopted by [GA07, CT07] and our scheme to be presented. Specifically, ReKeyGen first selects a random tokenβ to "hide" (some form of) the delegator's secret key a X (i.e., rk (2) X→Y = a X −β), and then encrypts this tokenβ under the delegatee's public key (i.e., rk
(1) X→Y = (Ȧ,Ḃ,Ċ)). First, we found that any re-encryption query (not necessary of the challenge ciphertext) reveals partial information aboutβ. Moreover, there is no validity check on the A component of the transformed ciphertext. The combined effect leads us to the following efficient attacker A, which aims to decrypt challenge ciphertext
1. Randomly pick m ∈ M and r ∈ Z (N X ) 2 , compute C ← Encrypt pk * X (m; r), i.e., using r as the randomness in the first step of Encrypt.
(Being a public key encryption, anyone can perform the encryption.) 2. Issue a re-encryption oracle query to re-encrypt the ciphertext C from pk * to pk, in par-
as the second component of the resulting transformed ciphertext C 0 . (Z here corresponds to A in the above description of SC09.)
(C is prepared by A, so A knows r.) 4. Issue a re-encryption oracle query to re-encrypt the ciphertext C * from pk * to pk, and obtain C 1 = (A, A , B, C,Ȧ,Ḃ,Ċ) as a result.
(The secret key of pk is not compromised by A, so this is legitimate.)
) s and A ← A · (g X0 ) rs . 6. Prepare C = (A, A , B, C,Ȧ,Ḃ,Ċ) issue a decryption oracle query under pk to decrypt C , and the result is the message encrypted in C * .
To see the correctness of the attack, first note that B, C,Ȧ,Ḃ,Ċ just come from the derivative (pk, C 1 ) of the challenge (pk * , C * ), and they are the only values from the ciphertext being used for the first three steps of Decrypt, so the correct value ofβ can be recovered.
Finally, C is not a derivative of C * . To check against the definition of derivative: 1) C * = C ; 2) A has made two re-encryption queries, C has nothing to do with the challenge C * , only (pk, C 1 ) is considered as a derivative of the challenge, but (pk, C ), where C 1 = C , is not its derivative; and 3) A has not made any re-encryption key generation oracle query at all.
Flaws in the Proof and A Possible Fix
This attack originated from some flaws in their proof [SC09] , specifically, two rejection rules regarding A in the decryption oracle simulation. There is no checking of A when decrypting a transformed ciphertext in the real scheme, which makes a noticeable difference to the adversary. The crux of our attack is the formulation of a new A component. One possible fix is to re-compute A in Decrypt and check whether it is correctly generated, which requires one more exponentiation in Z N 2 .
Our Proposed Unidirectional PRE Scheme
Construction
Our proposed unidirectional PRE scheme extends the bidirectional scheme proposed by Deng et al. [DWLC08] , again by the "token-controlled encryption" technique. As previously discussed in Section 3, however, this should be carefully done to avoid possible attacks.
Setup(κ):
Choose two primes p and q such that q|p−1 and the bit-length of q is the security parameter κ. Let g be a generator of group G, which is a subgroup of Z * q with order q. Choose four hash functions
The former three will be modeled as random oracles in our security proof. Here 0 and 1 are security parameters determined by κ, and the message space M is {0, 1} 0 . The parameters are param = (q, G, g, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , 0 , 1 ).
ReKeyGen(sk i , pk j ): On input user i's private key sk i = (x i,1 , x i,2 ) and user j's public key pk j = (pk j,1 , pk j,2 ), this algorithm generates the re-encryption key rk i→j as below:
Encrypt(pk i = (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ), m): To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ M:
Compute
E = pk H 4 (pk i,2 ) i,1 pk i,2 r and F = H 2 (g r ) ⊕ (m ω).
Compute s
ReEncrypt(rk i→j , C i , pk i , pk j ): On input a re-encryption (user i to user j) key rk i→j = (rk 1 i→j , V, W ), an original ciphertext C i = (D, E, F, s) under public key pk i = (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ), this algorithm re-encrypts C i into another one under public key pk j = (pk j,1 , pk j,2 ) as follows:
2. Otherwise, compute E = E rk 1 i→j , and output (E , F, V, W ). Let r = H 1 (m, ω), v = H 1 (h, π), the transformed ciphertext is of the following forms:
Encrypt 1 (pk i = (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ), m): To create a nontransformable ciphertext under public key pk i of a message m ∈ M:
Decrypt(sk i , C i ): On input a private key sk i = (x i,1 , x i,2 ) and ciphertext C i , parse C i , then work according to two cases:
-C is an original ciphertext in the form C = (D, E, F, s):
holds; else return ⊥.
-C is a transformed ciphertext in the form C = (E , F, V, W ):
and E = g H 1 (m,ω)·h hold; else ⊥.
Security Analysis
The intuition of CCA security can be seen from the below properties.
1. The validity of the original ciphertexts can be publicly verifiable by everyone including the proxy; otherwise, it will suffer from an attack as illustrated in [DWLC08] . For our scheme, the ciphertext component (D, s) in the original ciphertext (D, E, F, s) can be viewed as a signature signing the "message" (E, F ), that is how we get pubic verifiability.
2. The original ciphertexts should be CCA-secure. The original ciphertext produced by our scheme is indeed a "hashed" CCA-secure ElGamal encryption tightly integrated with a Schnorr signature. 3. The transformed ciphertexts should be CCA-secure In our scheme, a transformed ciphertext can be viewed as two seamlessly integrated "hashed" CCA-secure ElGamal encryptions.
We make four observations on the re-encryption key computation.
1. It takes the input of sk i , but not sk j , so our scheme is unidirectional. 2. Even though h can be recovered by anyone who owns sk j , rk 1 i→j only gives information about x i,1 H 4 (pk i,2 ) + x i,2 (no matter whom the delegatee j is), but not the concrete value of x i,1 or x i,2 . This gives an intuition why our scheme achieves delegator secret security. 3. A collusion of the delegatee and the proxy cannot recover x i,1 , which is needed to decrypt original ciphertexts. 4. If the delegatee j is now a delegator to someone else (say k). Again, only x j,1 H 4 (pk j,2 )+x j,2 is known to a collusion of the delegatee k and a proxy, which is not useful in recovering the token h in rk i→j , hence the chain collusion attack suffered by [GA07,CT07] does not apply.
Theorem 1. Our scheme is IND-PRE-CCA secure in the random oracle model, if the CDH assumption holds in group G and the Schnorr signature [Sch91] is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack.
The detailed proof can be found in the appendix. The proof first uses Coron's technique [Cor00] to implant our hard problem to many uncorrupted public keys. At the same time, for those uncorrupted public keys which is generated as usual (without the problem embedded), re-encryption key can still be generated with non-negligible probability.
To prove the original ciphertext security is relatively simple. For transformed ciphertext, an implicitly defined random h value which is unknown to the simulator may be used in the re-encryption key returned as the response to the oracles query. To answer decryption oracle queries, the simulator can extract the random h value used from the random oracle and unwrap the given ciphertext. For the challenge ciphertext generation, our definition of security rules out the case that both the delegator and the proxy are compromised, so any partial information regarding the value of h used in the re-encryption key would not affect the (different) h value associated with the challenge ciphertext.
For nontransformable ciphertext security, the situation is much simpler. The h value used in the challenge ciphertext is essentially a one-time pad, and the reduction boils down to the underlying hashed ElGamal encryption, so the simulator can compute all the re-encryption keys.
Efficiency Comparisons
In Table 2 , we compare our scheme with SC09 [SC09] with our suggested fix. We use t exp to denote the computational cost of an exponentiation. In our calculation, a multi-exponentiation (m-exp) (which we assume it multiplies only up to 3 exponentiations in one shot) is considered as 1.5t exp . Encrypt of LV08, ReEncrypt and Decrypt(C) of SC09 used 1, 2 and 2 m-exp respectively. In our scheme, we assume pk H 4 (pk i,2 ) i,1 pk i,2 is pre-computed. Even not, it only adds at most 1t exp in Encrypt, ReEncrypt and Decrypt(C) using m-exp, since there are other exponentiations to be done. The comparison indicates that our scheme beats SC09 in all aspects.
Decryption of C requires No delegator Decrypt pk X of the delegator public key is required Table 2 . Comparisons of Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes.
C denotes an original ciphertext and C denotes a transformed ciphertext, |C| and |C | are their size. NX (NY ) is the safe-prime modulus used by the delegator (delegatee).
Conclusions
Most existing unidirectional proxy re-encryption (PRE) schemes rely on pairing except a recently proposed scheme by Shao and Cao [SC09] . However, we showed that their CCAsecurity proof in the random oracle model is flawed, and presented a concrete attack. Possible fixes of their scheme further degrades either the decryption efficiency or the transformed ciphertext length. We then presented a natural construction of CCA-secure unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings that is very efficient.
Our scheme is single-hop and relies on the random oracle. It would be interesting to construct a multi-hop scheme in the standard model. It seems to be possible to use the tokencontrolled encryption approach to build a multi-hop scheme; however, the design may be inelegant and the efficiency may not be ideal. We remark that our scheme is proven under a relaxed security definition. We left it as an open problem to devise a pairing-free CCAsecure scheme without this relaxation. Another interesting problem, which possibly requires a different set of techniques, is to construct other schemes in proxy re-cryptography, such as conditional PRE schemes [CWC + 09] and proxy re-signatures [CP08, LV08a] , without pairings.
A Proof of Chosen-Ciphertext Security
A.1 Complexity Assumptions
Definition 7 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem). Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group with prime order q. The CDH problem in G is, given (g, g a , g b Pr B(g, g a , g b ) = g ab , where the probability is taken over the random choices of a, b and those made by B. We say that the (t, )-CDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm B has advantage at least in solving the CDH problem in G.
We show our reduction to an equivalent problem for higher readability, which is the divisible computation Diffie-Hellman (DCDH) problem introduced by Bao et al. [BDZ03] .
The task is to compute g b/a given (g, g a , g b ) ∈ G 3 with unknown a, b
It is shown in [BDZ03] that the DCDH and CDH are equivalent in the same group.
A.2 Preliminaries for the Proofs
Given an adversary A, who asks at most q H i random oracle quires to H i with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and breaks the (t, n u , n c , q rk , q re , q d , )-IND-PRE-CCA security of our scheme, we will show how to construct a polynomial time algorithm B which can break the CDH assumption in G or the existential unforgeability against chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) of the Schnorr signature with non-negligible advantage. For a cleaner proof, we assume that Schnorr signature is EUF-CMA secure.
Adversary A can choose to either attack the original ciphertext security (denoted by A orig ), the transformed ciphertext security (denoted by A tran ) or the nontransformable ciphertext security (denoted by A notr ). The proofs for security against A orig and A tran share many similarities, and the former may be a bit simpler. The proof for security against A notr is the simplest among all three. The corresponding reduction algorithms are B orig , B tran , and B notr . For brevity, we do not repeat parts of the simulations which are the same, but for these parts we will refer the reduction algorithm by B (∈ {B orig , B tran , B notr }) to avoid confusion.
Our proofs are given in the random oracle model, so we first describe how B simulates the random oracles. Algorithm B gives (q, G, g, H 1 , . . . , H 4 , 0 , 1 ) to A. Here H 1 , H 2 and H 3 are random oracles controlled by B. B maintains four hash lists H list i with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, which are initially empty, and responds the random oracles queries for A as shown in Figure 1 . B maintains two lists K list and R list which are initially empty, which stores the list of public/private key pairs and re-encryption key generated respectively.
A.3 Original Ciphertext Security
Key generations. B orig generates the uncorrupted-keys and corrupted-keys as follows.
-Uncorrupted-key generation. B orig picks x i,1
$ ← Z * q . and uses Coron's technique [Cor00] -flips a biased coin c i ∈ {0, 1} that yields 1 with probability θ and 0 otherwise.
• If c i = 1, it defines pk i = (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ) = (g x i,1 , g x i,2 );
• If c i = 0, it defines pk i = (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ) = ((g a )
B orig adds the tuple (pk i , x i,1 , x i,2 , c i ) to K list and returns pk i to A.
-Corrupted-key generation. B picks x j,1 , x j,2 $ ← Z * q , and defines pk j = (g x j,1 , g x j,2 ) , c j = '−'. It then adds the tuple (pk j , x j,1 , x j,2 , c j ) to K list and returns (pk j , (x j,1 , x j,2 )) to A. Phase 1. Adversary A issues a series of queries which B answers A as follows:
-OReK(pk i , pk j ): If R list has an entry for (pk i , pk j ), return the predefined re-encryption key to A. Otherwise, algorithm B acts as follows: 1. Recover tuples (pk i , x i,1 , x i,2 , c i ) and (pk j , x j,1 , x j,2 , c j ) from K list . 
Pick h
, and define τ = 1.
•
q , and define τ = 0.
• (c i = 0 ∧ c j = '−'): output "failure" and aborts. For c i = 1 or c i = '−', rk i→j is obviously correct due to sk i = (x i,1 , x i,2 ). For the case (c i = 0 ∧ c j = '−'), we defer the probability analysis to later part. For the cases where (c i = 0 ∧ c j = '−'), using a random rk i→j would not match with the value of h associated with (V, W ). For this, we will rely on the security of "hashed" ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam84, FO99, BSNS05] . 5. If B does not abort, add (pk i , pk j , (rk
-OReE(pk i = (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ), pk j = (pk j,1 , pk j,2 ), C i = (D, E, F, s)):
2. Recover tuples (pk i , x i,1 , x i,2 , c i ) and (pk j , x j,1 , x j,2 , c j ) from K list . 3. If (c i = 0 ∧ c j = '−') does not hold, issue a re-encryption key generation query pk i , pk j to obtain rk i→j , and then return ReEncrypt(rk i→j , C i , pk i , pk j ) to A.
4. Else, search for the tuple (m, ω, r) ∈ H list 1 such that (pk
If there exists no such tuple, return ⊥. (This corresponds to the event REErr to be explained). 5. Retrieve (pk i , pk j , ( * , V, W ), h, '−') from list R list , define E = g r·h . 6. If it is not found, we prepare a "partial" re-encryption key as follows.
. E is consistently computed as long as r can be retrieved, return (E , F, V, W ) to A -ODec(pk i , C i ): B first parses pk i = (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ) and recovers tuple (pk i , x i,1 , x i,2 , c i ) from K list . If c i = 1 or c i = '−', algorithm B runs Decrypt((x i,1 , x i,2 ), C i ) and returns the result to A. Otherwise, algorithm B works according to the following two cases: If yes, return m to A. Otherwise, return ⊥.
• C i is a transformed ciphertext C i = (E , F, V, W ): B decrypts according to two cases: * If there exists a tuple (pk j , pk i , (rk 1 , V, W ) 
If yes, return m to A, else return ⊥.
Note that all V, W values from R list are correctly generated.
Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a public key pk i * = (pk i * ,1 , pk i * ,2 ) and two equal-length messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} 0 . Algorithm B recovers tuple (pk i * , x i * ,1 , x i * ,2 , c * ) from K list . According to the constraints described in IND-PRE-CCA game, c * must be equal to 1 or 0. B orig picks δ $ ← {0, 1} and simulates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
1. If c * = 1, B orig outputs "failure" and aborts.
3. Pick e * , s * $ ← Z * q , and compute
5. Pick ω * $ ← {0, 1} 1 , and implicitly define H 1 (m δ , ω * ) = ab and H 2 (g ab ) = (m δ ω * ) ⊕ F * . 6. Return C * = (D * , E * , F * , s * ) as the challenge original ciphertext to adversary A orig .
Observe that the challenge ciphertext C * is identically distributed as the real one from the construction. To see this, letting u * s * − abe * and r * ab, we have
Phase 2. Adversary A continues to issue queries as in Phase 1, with the restrictions described in the IND-PRE-CCA game. Algorithm B responds to these queries for A as in Phase 1.
Guess. Eventually, adversary A returns a guess δ ∈ {0, 1} to B orig . Algorithm B orig randomly picks a tuple (R, β) from the list H list 2 . and outputs R as the solution to the given DCDH instance.
This completes the description of the simulation. It remains to related the probability for success and the execution time, which will be shown in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
A.4 Transformed Ciphertext Security
Key generations. B tran generates the uncorrupted-keys and corrupted-keys as follows.
-Uncorrupted-key generation. B tran firstly picks x i,1 , x i,2 $ ← Z * q . B tran flips a biased coin c i ∈ {0, 1} that yields 1 with probability θ and 0 otherwise.
B tran adds the tuple ((pk i,1 , pk i,2 ), x i,1 , x i,2 , c i ) to K list and returns (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ) to A. -Corrupted-key generation. Same as B orig . Phase 1. Adversary A issues a series of queries which B answers A as follows:
-OReK(pk i , pk j ): If R list has an entry for (pk i , pk j ), return the predefined re-encryption key to A. Otherwise, algorithm B acts as follows: 1. Recover tuples (pk i , x i,1 , x i,2 , c i ) and (pk j , x j,1 , x j,2 , c j ) from K list .
2. Construct the first component rk 1 i→j according to the following cases:
(The above two steps are exactly the same as those in ReKeyGen algorithm.) For c i = '−', rk i→j is obviously correct due to sk i = (x i,1 , x i,2 ). For c i = 1 ( a H 4 (pk i,2 ) + x i,1 )H 4 (pk i,2 ) + (−a + x i,2 ) = x i,1 H 4 (pk i,2 ) + x i,2 . Looking ahead, c i = 0 is where we plug the hard problem instance and pray that the adversary will choose it as the target in challenge phase
Using a random rk i→j would not match with the value of h associated with (V, W ). For this, we will rely on the security of "hashed" ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam84, FO99, BSNS05] .
• (c i = 0 ∧ c j = 1) or (c i = 0 ∧ c j = '−'): output "failure" and aborts. We defer the probability analysis to later part.
3. If B does not abort, add (pk i , pk j , (rk
Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a delegator's public key pk i = (pk i ,1 , pk i ,2 ), a delegatee's public key pk i * = (pk i * ,1 , pk i * ,2 ) and two equal-length messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} 0 . Algorithm B recovers tuples (pk i * , x i * ,1 , x i * ,2 , c * ) and tuple (pk i , x i ,1 , x i ,2 , c ) from K list . According to the constraints described in IND-PRE-CCA game, c * must be equal to 1 or 0. B simulates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
1. If c = 1 or c * = 1, B tran outputs "failure" and aborts. 2. If c = '−', in our security model A tran would not get rk i →i * which makes the simulation of ciphertext a special case of the simulation below.
If not found, do the following to define V * , W * and z * (and store them into list R list afterwards).
. Return C * = (E * , F * , V * , W * ) as the challenge ciphertext to adversary A tran .
Phase 2. Adversary A continues to issue queries as in Phase 1, with the restrictions described in the IND-PRE-CCA game. Algorithm B responds to these queries for A tran as in Phase 1.
Guess. Eventually, adversary A tran returns a guess δ ∈ {0, 1} to B. Algorithm B tran first retrieves (m δ , ω, r) from the list H list 1 and test if (g a ) r·rk i →i * (x i ,1 H 4 (pk i ,2 )+x i ,2 )/t = g b . If no such entry is found, B tran randomly picks a tuple (R, β) from the list H list 2 and outputs R x i * ,2 /z * as the solution to the given DCDH instance. This completes the description of the simulation. It remains to related the probabilities for success and the execution times of the simulation and the adversary, which will be shown in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
A.5 Nontransformable Ciphertext Security
Without loss of generality, we assume that the Schnorr signature is (t , ν)-EUF-CMA secure for some probability 0 < ν < . suppose there exists a t-time adversary A who can break the IND-PRE-CCA security of our scheme for nontransformable ciphertext with advantage − ν, then we show how to construct an algorithm B which can break the (t , )-CDH assumption in G, given as input a CDH challenge tuple (g, g a , g b ). To output g ab eventually, algorithm B notr acts as the challenger and plays the IND-PRE-CCA game with adversary A notr in the following way.
-Uncorrupted key generation: Algorithm B notr first picks x i,1 , x i,2 $ ← Z * q , and define pk i = (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ) = (g a )
1/H 4 (pk i,2 ) · g x i,1 , g x i,2 /g a . Next, set c i = 0 and add the tuple (pk i , x i,1 , x i,2 , c i )
to the K list . Finally, it returns pk i to adversary A. The private key with respect to pk i is sk i = ( a H 4 (pk i,2 ) + x i,1 , −a + x i,2 ), is unknown to both B notr and A notr . -Corrupted key generation: B notr picks x j,1 , x j,2 $ ← Z * q and defines pk j = (g x j,1 , g x j,2 ) and c j = 1. It then adds the tuple (pk j , x j,1 , x j,2 , c j ) to the K list and returns (pk j , (x j,1 , x j,2 ) ).
-Re-encryption key generation: For the re-encryption key from user i to user j, B notr parses pk i as pk i = (pk i,1 , pk i,2 ) and pk j = (pk j,1 , pk j,2 ). Next, it recovers tuples (pk i , x i,1 , x i,2 , c i ) and (pk j , x j,1 , x j,2 , c j ) from the K list . Then, it constructs the re-encryption key rk i→j for adversary A according to the following situations:
Phase 1. ODec: Same as B orig . Challenge. When A notr decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a public key pk i * = (pk i * ,1 , pk i * ,2 ) and two equal-length messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} 0 . Algorithm B notr responds as follows:
, 1} 1 , and issue an H 1 query on (m δ , ω * ) to obtain the response
. Return C * = (E * , E * , F * , W * ) as the challenge ciphertext to adversary A notr .
Observe that the challenge ciphertext C * is identically distributed as the real one from the construction. To see this, letting r * = b, we have
Guess. 
If AskH * 2 happens, algorithm B will be able to solve DCDH instance. Therefore, we obtain
From the description of the simulation, B's running time can be bounded by
A.6 Lemmata for Probability Analysis of the Simulations Lemma 1. With A orig , B can solve the DCDH problem with advantage within time t where
t exp denotes the time to exponentiate in group G, e is the base of the natural logarithm,
is in fact an encryption of h under pk j,2 using the "hashed" ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam84, FO99, BSNS05] , which is based on the CDH assumption.
To reduce the indistinguishability to that of the underlying encryption scheme, we need the two following facts.
1. The value v is generated at random and is unrelated to any other values -v is determined by H 1 (h, π), see the point below. 2. The values h and π are not used elsewhere in the proof -this is ensured since rk i→j is randomly chosen (this is the only other place where h may appear) and the decryption oracle only returns the message instead of any intermediate values like h or π.
One may also refer to the proof for the transformed ciphertext security to see how the DCDH problem instance is embedded to (V, W ). We remark that even though the value of h is a function of the unknown secret key of the delegator, the simulator can execute in a different "mode" such that the value of the secret key of the delegator is known, as we are relying on the security of the underlying encryption with respect to the delegatee here.
Next, we analyze the simulation of the re-encryption queries. This simulation is also perfect, unless A orig can submit valid original ciphertexts without querying hash function H 1 (denote this event by REErr). However, since H 1 acts as a random oracle, we have Pr[REErr] leq qre q . The simulation of the decryption oracle is perfect, with the exception that simulation errors may occur in rejecting some valid ciphertexts. However, these errors are not significant as shown below: Suppose a ciphertext C has been queried to the decryption oracle. Even if C is a valid ciphertext, there is a possibility that C can be produced without querying g r to H 2 , where r = H 1 (m, ω). Let Valid be an event that C is valid. Let AskH 2 and AskH 1 respectively be the events that g r has been queried to H 2 and (m, ω) has been queried to
q . To see, the probability that A can come up with a "valid" E with respect to the public key and the H 1 's output without querying H 1 at that point is 1 q . Similarly, A can come up with a "valid" F with respect to the H 2 's output without querying H 2 at the concerned point is again This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
B Delegator Secret Security
Delegator secret security is formally defined via the following game:
Setup. Challenger C runs Setup(1 κ ) and gives the global parameters param to A. Queries. A adaptively issues queries q 1 , . . . , q m where query q i is one of the following: -Uncorrupted-key generation query: C first runs KeyGen() to obtain a public/private key pair (pk i , sk i ), and then sends pk i to A. -Corrupted-key generation query: C first runs KeyGen() to obtain a public/private key pair (pk j , sk j ), and then gives (pk j , sk j ) to A. -Re-encryption key query pk i , pk j : C runs ReKeyGen(sk i , pk j ) to generate a re-encryption key rk i→j and returns it to A. Here sk i is the private key with respect to pk i . It is required that pk i and pk j were generated beforehand a key generation query, either corrupted or uncorrupted. Output. Finally, A outputs a private key sk i * with respect to the public key pk i * . A wins the game if sk i * is indeed a valid private key came from a uncorrupted-key generation query.
We refer to the above adversary A as a DSK adversary, and define his advantage in attacking the PRE scheme's delegator secret security as Adv DSK PRE,A = Pr[A wins], where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by the challenger and the adversary.
Definition 9. We say that a PRE scheme is (t, n u , n c , q rk , )-DSK secure, if for any t-time DSK adversary A that makes at most q rk re-encryption key queries, Adv DSK PRE,A ≤ .
Definition 10. The discrete logarithm (DL) problem in G is, given a tuple (g, g a ) ∈ G 2 with unknown a, to compute a.
Definition 11. For a polynomial-time algorithm B, we define his advantage in solving the DL problem in G as Adv
DL B
Pr[B(g, g a ) = a], where the probability is taken over the random choices of a in Z q , the random choice of g in G, and the random bits consumed by B. We say that the (t, )-DL assumption holds in group G, if no t-time adversary B has advantage at least in solving the DL problem in G.
The delegator secret security of our scheme can be ensured by the following Theorem 2. We remark that it does not rely on the random oracle model. Theorem 2. Our scheme has delegator secret security if the DL assumption holds in G. Concretely, if there exists an DSK adversary A, who breaks the (t, q u , q c , q rk , )-DSK security of our scheme, then there exists an algorithm B which can break the (t , )-DL assumption in G with t ≤ t + O(2n u t exp + 2n c t exp + 2q rk t exp ).
